今年迄今，人民币汇率下跌0.7%，至1美元兑6.25元人民币上下。2014年人民币汇率已下跌了2.4%，这是自2005年中国放弃盯住美元汇率制度以来，首次出现全年大幅下跌。
这轮贬值发生在中国贸易顺差增长的背景下，而在2005年到2013年期间，贸易顺差推动人民币汇率累计上升了37%。
2014年12月，中国取得有记录以来第二大月度贸易顺差，而中国各银行的外汇购买量——这一指标可粗略衡量资金流入规模——却减少了1180亿元人民币（合190亿美元），这是有记录以来的最大月度跌幅。
通常，由于出口商需要把收自境外客户的美元换成人民币，贸易顺差会导致银行买入的外汇增加。然而，分析师表示，在出口商预计人民币会下跌的情况下，他们不再把收到的美元换成人民币。此外，以投资为目的的外汇流出，也对贸易所产生的流入起到了抵消作用。
根据外汇交易员的说法，贸易顺差不再是汇率波动和资金流动的主要推动因素。与此相反，市场对美国的加息预期，以及欧洲和日本央行的量化宽松举措，推动资金流出新兴市场、流向美元资产。
上海某小型中资商业银行的一名交易员表示：“过去所有人都只关注贸易数据。如今，人们在关注利率和欧元行情。”
事实上，最新一轮人民币贬值表明，虽然中国实行严格资本管制，限制短期资金流入和流出中国，但对于过去曾冲击其他新兴市场货币的因素，中国已不具有免疫力。
很多年来，投资者一直想方设法规避资本管制，将资金投入中国。如今，资金却在以相反的方向流动。去年，中国对外直接投资规模首次超过了所吸引的外商直接投资(FDI)。随着中国企业海外并购的增多，这一趋势将会加速。
资金外流也在加速。中国的国际收支平衡表数据显示，2季度和3季度金融账户赤字总计近250亿美元。4季度数据预计将显示资金外流加剧。
“人民币还会继续走弱。”上海耀之资产管理(Yaozhi Asset Management)投资交易总监王影峰说，“欧洲、中国和其他新兴市场的经济都出现了疲软，而美国一枝独秀。这与美元相对全球其他货币走强密切相关。”
人们普遍预计，到今年年底，人民币兑美元汇率会达到6.4至6.5，比去年末下跌3%至5%。
分析师表示，人民币升值预期的转向，部分解释了为什么市场对高调启动的“沪港通”项目热情不高。这个让境外投资者首次能够直接投资沪市的项目开通已有两个月，并且中国内地股票的表现位于全世界前列，然而沪股通3000亿元人民币的总额度只用掉了不到三分之一。
当然，相对于欧元、日元和新加坡元等其他货币，人民币跌幅是很小的。事实上，国际清算银行(BIS)数据显示，尽管人民币对美元下跌，但人民币名义有效汇率去年下半年上升了10%。
一些分析师认为人民币下跌是中国央行(PBoC)有意为之，是为了维护出口竞争力打的货币战。但去年4季度外汇储备减少，显示央行或许曾有意通过干预推高、而非打压人民币币值。
中国央行持续将每日人民币汇率中间价设在即期汇率以上，进一步显示当局不希望看到人民币大幅下跌。
高盛(Goldman Sachs)首席亚洲经济学家安德鲁•蒂尔顿(Andrew Tilton)表示，政策制定者不太可能人为推动人民币贬值，因为这样做会波及北京方面的改革努力。
他说：“这与他们的其他政策目标是不一致的，比如让人民币在国际上得到更广泛使用，以及吸引境外投资者到中国股市投资。”
（中国进出口网）
After nearly a decade in which robust trade surpluses underpinned reliable appreciation of China’s currency, the renminbi is under pressure from a bout of capital outflow and the knock-on effects of falls in the euro, yen and emerging market currencies.
The renminbi has fallen 0.7 per cent so far this year to about Rmb6.25 per US dollar, following a dro of 2.4 per cent in 2014 — its first full year of significant depreciation since the central bank ended its strict dollar peg in 2005.
Yet the fall has occurred in spite of a swelling of China’s trade surplus, which propelled the renminbi’s 37 per cent rise between 2005 and 2013.
In December China posted its second-biggest monthly trade surplus on record, but foreign exchange purchases by its banks — a rough proxy for capital inflows — fell Rmb118bn ($19bn), the largest monthly decline on record.
Ordinarily a trade surplus leads to larger bank forex purchases, as exporters swap dollars from overseas customers for local currency. But exporters expect the renminbi to fall and are no longer converting dollar receipts, analysts say. In addition investment-linked forex outflows are offsetting the impact of inflows from trade.
According to currency traders the trade surplus is no longer the driving force behind exchange rate movements and capital flows. Instead expectations of rising US interest rates, combined with quantitative easing by European and Japanese central banks, have propelled outflows from emerging markets and into dollar assets.
“It used to be everyone just looked at trade data. Now people are looking at the interest rates and the euro,” says a trader at a small Chinese commercial bank in Shanghai.
Indeed the latest bout of weakness shows that in spite of strict capital controls, which limit the ability of short-term funds to slosh in and out of the country, China is not immune to the forces that have battered other emerging market currencies.
After years in which investors clamoured to find ways to circumvent controls and bring money into the country, funds are flowing in the opposite direction. Outbound foreign direct investment outstripped inbound FDI for the first time last year, a trend that is set to accelerate as Chinese companies increase overseas acquisitions.
Financial outflows are also picking up. China posted a combined $25bn deficit on the financial account in the second and third quarters, balance of payments data show. Fourth-quarter data are expected to show further outflows.
“Renminbi weakness has further to run,” says Wang Yifeng, head of investment at Yaozhi Asset Management in Shanghai. “Europe, China and emerging markets are all showing economic weakness, while the US is outperforming. The link to the dollar’s global strength is very intimate.”
Consensus forecasts have the renminbi at 6.4 to 6.5 by the year-end, a fall of 3-5 per cent from last year’s close.
Analysts say the reversal of expectations for the currency partially explains the lack of enthusiasm for the much-vaunted Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect. Two months after the launch of a programme that offers foreign investors unprecedented access to the Shanghai stock market — and in spite of the world-beating performance of mainland shares — less than a third of the Rmb300bn quota has been used.
To be sure, the renminbi’s fall is tiny compared with other currencies such as the euro, yen and Singapore dollar. Indeed, in spite of the renminbi’s decline against the dollar, its nominal effective exchange rate — a gauge of its value against a trade-weighted basket of currencies — rose 10 per cent in the second half of last year, data from the Bank for International Settlements show.
Some analysts consider the renminbi’s fall an intentional act by the People’s Bank of China, which is marching into a currency war to defend export competitiveness. But the dro in foreign exchange reserves in the fourth quarter last year suggests that the central bank may have intervened to prop up the currency, rather than drive it down.
The PBoC has consistently set its daily midpoint price stronger than the spot rate, a further signal that authorities do not want the currency to fall sharply.
Andrew Tilton, chief Asia economist at Goldman Sachs, says policy makers are unlikely to pursue a weaker currency because of the knock-on effects such a move would have on Beijing’s reform efforts.
“It is inconsistent with some of the other policy goals they have, such as wanting the renminbi to be used more broadly as an international currency, and wanting foreigners to invest in the stock market,” he says.
